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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SEAN THOMPSON, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
; Case No.20000071-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1999). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Utah Code Annotated 76-9-201 is unconstitutional 
on its face and as applied? A constitutional challenge to a 
statute presents a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Mohi, 901 P. 2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995). 
Moreover, this Court should apply ''strict scrutiny" to this case 
as it impacts freedom of speech as located in the and First 
Amendment. See, St. George v. Turner, 860 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah 
1993) . 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201 
(1) A person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject 
to prosecution in the jurisdiction where the telephone call 
originated or was received if with intent to annoy, alarm 
another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten harass, or 
frighten any person at the called number or recklessly 
creating a risk thereof, the person: 
(a) makes a telephone call, whether or not a 
conversation ensues; 
(b) makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not 
a conversation ensues, or after having been told 
not call back, causes the telephone of another to 
ring repeatedly or continuously; 
(c) makes a telephone cal and insults, taunts, or 
challenges the recipient of the telephone call or 
any person at the called number in a manner likely 
to provoke a violent or disorderly response; 
(d) makes a telephone call and uses any lewd or 
profane language or suggests any lewd or lacivious 
act; or 
(e) makes a telephone call and threatens to 
inflict injury, physical harm, or damage to any 
person or the property of any person. 
(2) Telephone harassment is a class B misdemeanor. 
United States Constitution, Amendment I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for redress of grievances. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV 
....No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person, of 
life liberty or property, without due process f law; nor 
deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
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Utah Constitution, Article I, § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 15 
No person shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press.... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Sean P. Thompson appeals from a bench trial conviction of 
Telephone Harassment, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated §76-9-201, as adopted by Provo City. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court 
On or about May 1, 1999, Thompson was charged by Information 
with Telephone Harassment, a class B misdemeanor, in Fourth 
District Court, Provo Department. 
On October 29, 1999, a bench trial was held before the 
Honorable Anthony W. Schofield. After testimony from the alleged 
victim, the responding officer, and Thompson, the Court ruled in 
favor of the City of Provo and convicted Thompson of telephone 
harassment. On December 20, 1999, Thomson was sentenced to 15 
hours of community service and a $250 fine. On January 19, 
2000, Thompson filed a notice of appeal in the Fourth District 
Court. 
\ \ \ 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In the bench trial the alleged victim, Ms. Thayer, testified 
that Thompson called numerous times within the hour.(Tr. At 7). 
Thayer testified that she asked Thompson to cease his phone 
calls.(Tr. At 8) The responding police officer, Bastian, 
testified that while he was at the home of Thayer investigating 
the telephone calls, Thompson again called, wherein Bastian 
picked up the receiver and spoke with Thompson.(Tr. at 13). 
Bastian requested to meet with Thompson at Thompson's home.(Tr. 
at 14). Upon arriving at Thompson's home Bastian indicated that 
he smelled alcohol and Thompson admitted to drinking beer.(Tr. at 
14) . 
Thompson took the stand and testified that he received a 
telephone call from Thayer and she told Thompson that she was 
going to harm herself (suicide) and possibly harm Thompson's 
daughter.x (Tr. at 17 & 20). Thompson testified that he called 
Thayer numerous times because he feared Thayer was a danger to 
herself and to Thompson's daughter.(Tr. at 21). Thompson 
repeatedly called Thayer because he was taught in school to keep 
calling to assist the person threatening suicide.(Tr. at 20). 
The alleged victim and Thompson were recently divorced and are parents of a daughter. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Since the Utah Court of Appeals has declared applicable 
sections of Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201 unconstitutional, 
Thompson asks that this Court reverse the conviction. The facts 
of this case provide standing for Thompson to challenge the 
telephone harassment statute's constitutionality. The telephone 
harassment statute in this case has a real and substantial 
deterrent effect on protected speech and a court's narrowing 
construction of the statute is not possible. Because the statute 
is overbroad and vague it must be stricken down because it 
violates the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the United States Constitution as well as Article I, §§ 7 and 15 
of the Utah Constitution. Given the above the telephone 
harassment statute cannot be applied to Thompson or anyone else. 
ARGUMENT 
THOMPSON'S CONVICTION OF TELEPHONE HARASSMENT SHOULD 
BE REVERSED BECAUSE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §76-9-201 
HAS BEEN DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
ON ITS FACE AND AS APPLIED 
Recently this court has ruled on the issue of Utah Code 
Annotated §76-9-201 in Provo City v. Whatcott. Provo v. Whatcott, 
1 P.3d 1113, (Ut. App. 2000). In Whatcott, this court ruled that 
provisions within Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201 are overbroad, 
Id. at 6. A statute that is determined to be unconstitutional on 
its face must be stricken down in its entirety, disallowing the 
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statute to be applied against Thompson or anyone else. Provo City 
Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d at 459(Utah 1989J; Logan City v. 
Huber, 786 P.2d at 1377(Utah App. 1990). Given this court's 
recent ruling, which is on point, Thompson's conviction should be 
reversed. 
I. In General 
Speech is protected by the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution as well as Article I, Section 15 of the Utah 
Constitution.2 
A. Standing 
A defendant has NNgeneral standing" when he can show " xsome 
distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in 
the outcome of the legal dispute.' " Willden, 768 P2d. at 456 
(quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983)). 
Thompson was convicted under Utah's telephone harassment statute 
demonstrating he "indisputably has standing to challenge the 
ordinance, at least as it has been applied to him." Willden, 768 
P.2d at 457. 
Thompson also has standing to challenge the statute on 
its face as to the statute's constitutional validity. A statute 
may be held facially invalid even if it can be applied 
2
 Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution provides in part "No law shall be passed to 
abridge or restrain the freedom of speech ...." and has been interpreted as granting at least as 
much protection as the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.. KUTV, Inc. v. 
Conder, 668 P.2d 513 (Utah 1983). 
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legitimately in the facts of this particular case. Logan City v. 
Huber, 786 P.2d 1372 (Utah App. 1990). Upon a determination that 
the statute is unconstitutional on its face the statute must be 
stricken down in its entirety, disallowing the statute to be 
applied against Thompson or anyone else. Willden, 768 P.2d at 
459; Huber, 786 P.2d at 1377. 
Generally, a person may not challenge the facial validity of 
a statute on grounds that it may conceivably be applied 
unconstitutionally to others not before the court. State v. 
Haig, 578 P. 2d 837, 841 (Utah 1978). However, this is not so 
when we are dealing with First Amendment protections. The First 
Amendment overbreadth and vagueness standing doctrines represent 
a departure from the traditional rule. The doctrines are 
designed to give standing to anyone who is subject to an 
overbroad or vague statute that chills the exercise of First 
Amendment rights of others. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 
521, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1105, 31 L.Ed.2d 408; Willden, 768 P.2d at 
457. The doctrine "gives a defendant standing to challenge a 
statute on behalf of others not before the court even if the law 
could be constitutionally applied to the defendant/' Salt Lake 
City v. Lopez, 935, P.2d 1259, 1263 n. 2 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997); See 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 816, 95 S. Ct. 222, 2230, 44 
L.Ed.2d 600 (1975); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 
S. Ct. 2908, 2916, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 
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837, 840 (Utah 1978). The rationale for this exception is that 
the First Amendment rights infringed upon are so important that 
their protection need not wait for the perfect litigant. 
Willden, 768 P.2d at 457. Hence, a defendant does have standing 
to challenge the statute on grounds of both unconstitutional 
overbreadth and vagueness as applied to others. Gooding, 405 
U.S. at 521, 92 S. Ct. at 1105. When faced with First Amendment 
overbreadth and vagueness attacks on a statute, this Court should 
first address overbreadth. Logan City v. Huber, 786 P. 2d 1372, 
1375 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). 
B. Overbreadth 
The Supreme Court has stated that when a statute or 
ordinance aims at penalizing an unprotected class of speech, it 
"must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to 
punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of 
application to protected expression/7 Gooding, 405 U.S. at 522, 
92 S.Ct. at 1106; See Huber, 786 P.2d at 1375. The 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech do not allow the 
government to punish words outside of "narrowly limited classes 
of speech/' Huber 786 P.2d at 1374. An overbroad enactment is 
one "xwhich does not aim specifically at evils within the 
allowable area of state control, but, on the contrary, sweeps 
within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances 
constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or the press.' vv 
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Huber, 786 P.2d at 1375 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 
88, 97, 60 S.Ct. 736, 741-42, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940)). 
The merit of a First Amendment overbreadth challenge is 
determined by analyzing two factors: (1) Whether the statute's " 
^deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both real and 
substantial;' : and (2) Whether the statute is * readily subject 
to a narrowing construction by the state courts.' " State v. Halg 
578 P.2d 837, 841 (Utah 1978) (quoting Erznoznlk v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2276, 45 L.Ed,2d 
125(1975)). If the statute's deterrent effect on protected 
expression is both real and substantial and the statute is not 
readily subject to a narrowing construction by state courts then 
it is unconstitutionally overbroad. 
1. Substantial Deterrent Effect. 
Utah's telephone harassment statute has a real and 
substantial deterrent effect on protected speech. For example, 
the statute precludes one from making a telephone call with 
intent to "alarm" another. The deterrent effect of this language 
on constitutionally protected speech has no limits. This 
overbroad choice of words conceivably makes it criminal in Utah 
to call one's neighbor and warn him that his house is on fire, or 
to call a friend and forecast an approaching storm. See Bolles 
v. People, 541 P.2d 80, 83 (Col. 1975) (en banc). 
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The statute also precludes one from making a telephone call 
with intent to "annoy" another. There are many instances where 
one may call another with the intention of causing a slight 
annoyance for perfectly legitimate constitutionally protected 
purposes. Conceivably, this statute could make criminal a single 
telephone call made by the following individuals: a consumer who 
wishes to express dissatisfaction over the performance of a 
produce or service; a businessman disturbed with another's 
failure to perform a contractual obligation; an irate citizen who 
wishes to complain to a public official; an individual bickering 
over family matters; or a creditor seeking to collect payment of 
a past due bill. See People v. Klick. 362 N.E.2d 329, 331-32 
(111. 1977). 
The term "harass"3 as used in the statute is merely a 
persistent annoyance and should be considered on the same 
guidelines as "annoy". Conceivably, this statute could make 
criminal repeated telephone calls made by the following 
individuals: a consumer who wishes to express dissatisfaction 
over the performance of a produce or service that continues to 
fail after being repaired. Indeed the "lemon laws" to handle 
such situations expect the dissatisfaction of a consumer who 
expresses dissatisfaction on more than one occasion.; a 
3
 Meriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, "Harass - lb - annoy 
persistently." 
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businessman disturbed with another's failure to perform a 
contractual obligation after being told once of the 
dissatisfaction but because of no change behavior must call back 
and "harass"; or even a person/therapist/police officer 
attempting to stop a suicide and calling back to ensure the 
person does not harm herself. 
The first Amendment is made of "sterner stuff." Bolles, 
P.2d at 83. The people of Utah must not live in continual fear 
that something they say over the telephone with intent to 
"annoy", "harass", "offend ", or "alarm" the listener will invoke 
the statute. Free speech may best fulfill its high purpose when 
it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with 
present conditions or even stirs people to anger. Cox v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52, 85 S.Ct. 453, 462-63, 13 L.Ed.2d 
471 (1965). 
Unquestionably, the State of Utah has a legitimate and 
substantial interest in protecting its residents from fear and 
abuse at the hands of persons who employ the telephone to torment 
others. United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3rd Cir. 
1978); Klick, 362 N.E.2d at 331. The State also has a legitimate 
interest in protecting the privacy of its residents' homes from 
the intrusion of unwanted and perverse phone calls. City of 
Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617, 619 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
However, the means chosen by the legislature to address these 
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interests sweep to broadly. Clearly, the legislature failed in 
its duty to employ the least drastic means available to achieve 
these purposes. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 
247, 252, 5 L.Ea.2d 231 (1960). 
First of all, Utah's telephone harassment statute is not 
limited to intrusions into the home. Furthermore, it is not 
limited to communications which abuse the listener "in an 
essentially intolerable manner" as required by the Constitution 
when the government seeks to "shut off discourse solely to 
protect others from hearing it." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 
15, 21, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1786, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). Plainly, the 
statute lacks the "precision of regulation" required by a statute 
"so closely touching our most precious freedoms." NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9 L.Ed.2d (405) 
(1963). Thus, the deterrent effect of the statute on legitimate 
speech is both real and substantial. 
2. Narrowing Judicial Construction. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201 is not readily subject to a 
narrowing construction by the State's courts. While Utah courts 
favor construing a law so as to carry out its legislative intent 
and avoiding constitutional conflicts, it will not rewrite a 
statute or ignore its plain intent. Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 
768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989); Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 
1259, 1262 (Ut, Ct. App. 1997); Logan City v. Ruber, 786 P.2d 
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1372, 1377 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). One may argue that the statue 
should be narrowly construed to prohibit phone calls made "with 
intent to annoy, alarm ... or frighten any person ...," but only 
when made for no lawful purpose. While such a narrowing 
construction of the statute may eliminate some of its 
constitutional inadequacies, it is clear that the legislature did 
not intend to qualify the statute in that manner. In 1994, the 
statute was amended to delete the words "without purpose of 
lawful communications/' Hence, narrowly construing the statute 
to apply only in situations where the phone call was made for now 
lawful purpose would do "impermissible violence to the clear 
language of the ordinance/7 Willden, 768 P.2d at 458, and would 
be contrary to the legislature's plain intent. 
3. Examples of Overbroad Telephone Harassment Statutes: 
Several courts have held statutes similar to the one at 
issue here to be unconstitutional on grounds of overbreadth. 
E.g., People v. Klick, 362 N.E. 2d 329 (111. 1977); Bolles v. 
People, 541 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1975) (en banc); City of Everett v. 
Moore, 683 P.2d 617 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). The language of these 
statutes and Utah's statute is clearly distinguishable from the 
narrowly tailored telephone harassment statutes that were upheld 
in Iowa v. Jaeger, 249 N.W. 2d 688 (Iowa 1977), Jones v. 
Municipality of Anchorage, 754 P.2d 275 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988), 
and Arizona v. Hagen, 558 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). 
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Similar to Utah's statute, these statutes specified the intent 
with which the call must be made; however, contrary to Utah's 
statute, these valid statutes also specify the nature of the 
speech prohibited (e.g., obscene, lewd, profane, and 
threatening).4 The categories of language prohibited by these 
statues are consistent with those held to be unprotected by the 
Constitution in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 
62, S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed.1031 (1942). Subsections 1(a) and 
(b) of Utah's telephone harassment statute, on the other hand, 
make no attempt to specify the nature of speech prohibited. As 
in the case at hand subsections (a) and (b) directly apply. 
C. Vagueness 
If this Court determines that Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201 
is unconstitutionally overbroad, it may be held facially invalid 
and this Court need not even address the vagueness challenge. 
However, if the overbreadth challenge fails then this Court 
should next examine the facial vagueness challenge. Logan City 
v. Ruber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1375, 1377 n.13 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). 
Virtually every potentially vague term used in Utah's 
telephone harassment statute has been challenged in one State or 
another. The court's decisions have been anything but 
4The statues upheld in Jaeger and Hagen read as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any 
person, with intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy or offend, to telephone another 
and use obscene, lewd or profane language or suggest any lewd or lascivious act, or threat to in 
flict injury or physical harm to the person or property of any person " (emphasis added). 
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consistent.b Usually, however, statutes containing similarly 
vague terms such as "anno/' and "alarm" or "lewd" and "profane" 
are upheld by the courts. This is largely due to the clarifying 
effects of other statutory elements or because of the willingness 
of courts to impose narrowing judicial constructions on the 
terms; the survival of the statutes can hardly be attributed to 
the precision of the terms themselves. M. Sean Royall, 
Constitutionally Regulating Telephone Harassment: An Exercise in 
Statutory Precision, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1403, 1412 (Fall 1989). 
The Case of State v. L.G.W., 641 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1982), is an 
example of the Utah Supreme Court applying such a narrowing 
construction on the term "lewdness" to avoid its inherent 
vagueness. 
While there is no hard and fast rule indicating which words 
are vague and which ones are not, one may look to the purposes of 
the vagueness doctrine to determine whether the terms used in the 
statute at hand are indeed vague. The vagueness doctrine 
declares a law unconstitutional if persons "A of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as 
to its application.' " U.S. v. Lanier, U.S. , 117 S. 
s
 Compare, e.g., State v. Sanderson, 575 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), City of 
Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617, 619 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), and People v. Norman, 703 P.2d 
1261, 1266 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (statues containing the phrase "alarms or seriously annoys" 
were found void for vagueness; with Kinney v. State. 404 N.E. 2d 49, 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) and 
Donley v. City of Mountain Brook, 429 S.2d 603, 611 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982) (upholding two 
nearly identical statutes). 
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Ct. 1219, 1225, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (quoting Connally v. 
General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 
70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)). The doctrine reflects the principle that 
no person should be held criminally responsible for conduct whic 
he could not reasonably understand to be forbidden. Lanier, 117 
S. Ct. at 1225. The reasons for the doctrine are three fold. 
Two of those reasons address Fourteenth Amendment due process 
concerns and the third addresses First amendment interests: 
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between 
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the 
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. 
Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair 
warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit 
standards for those who apply them . . . . Third, but 
related, where a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas o 
basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the 
exercise of those freedoms. 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S. Ct. 229 
2298-99-33 L.Ed.2d 222(1972); See West Valley City v. Streeter, 
849 P.2d 613, 615 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). 
With regard to the First Amendment vagueness concerns, the 
Supreme Court has intimated that "'stricter standards of 
permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute 
having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the 
less be required to act at his peril here, because the free 
dissemination of ideas may be the loser/' Smith v. California, 
361 U.S. 147, 151, 80 S.Ct. 215, 217-18, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1960). 
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201 prohibits an actor from using 
a telephone to "annoy, alarm another, intimidate, offend, abuse, 
threaten, harass, or frighten any person at the called number, or 
recklessly creating a risk thereof . . . ." Consequently, a caller 
could be prosecuted for espousing Catholic doctrine that offends 
a Mormon recipient, or for frightening a child at the called 
number who might overhear [e.g., through a speaker phone] a 
discussion of frightening scenes from Hannibal, or alarm a 
neighbor by informing him about a proposed property tax increase, 
or harass a friend by suggesting he will be whipped at the next 
game of pick-up neighborhood basketball, and so on, and so on, 
and so on .... The all encompassing language of the statute's 
specific intent provisions does not put one on adequate notice of 
when the content of a single call might be prohibited. When can 
one probe religious doctrine before the recipient is offended 
such that the call becomes criminal? Is it a crime if a child at 
the called number is frightened by a discussion of one's war 
experience? How does a caller know where to draw the line when 
calling about political topics which might alarm the listener" 
This statute simply does not provide one with a fair and 
understandable warning of when a crime will occur and how to 
avoid committing it. 
The vagueness doctrine also exists to prevent arbitrary law 
enforcement and to prevent the inhibition of First Amendment 
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freedoms. In fact, the requirement that a legislature establish 
clear guidelines to govern law enforcement is more important that 
providing fair notice. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58, 
103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); See Greenwood v. 
City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 716, 819 (Utah 1991). The lack 
of clear guidelines in the telephone harassment statute 
(ordinance) gives law enforcement unbounded discretion to apply 
the vague law selectively and also subjects the exercise of free 
speech to an unascertainable standard. Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 
174, 178 (5th Cir. 1983) . 
Lastly, because they may not know what exactly it means to 
''annoy", "harass", " alarm", or "offend" another, citizens of Utah 
may inhibit their speech to avoid the risk of being victimized by 
arbitrary law enforcement. Since a statute that is capable of 
reaching First Amendment freedoms demands a greater degree of 
specificity than in other contexts, the statute should be 
stricken on vagueness grounds. Smith, 361 U.S. at 151, 80 S. Ct. 
at 217-18. 
If this Court determines that the statute is facially vague, 
it may cure the statute's vagueness by instructing the jury in a 
way that sufficiently limits the meaning of the statute. Kramer, 
712 F.2d at 178, n. 6. For example, the court may clearly define 
for the jury what it means to "annoy", "harass", "alarm", or to 
"offend" another and precisely what "lewd" or "profane" language 
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is. In fact, a court is "obliged to seek to construe a criminal 
statute to give specific content to terms that might otherwise be 
unconstitutionally vague/' State v. L.G.W., 641 P.2d 127, 131 
(Utah 1982). If the statute, as authoritatively construed by the 
court, passes constitutional scrutiny then it will not be 
overturned on vagueness grounds. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 572-73, 62 S. Ct., 766, 769-770, 86 L.Ed. 1031 
(1942). However, as argued above, the terms "lewd", 
"lascivious", and "profane", even if adequately defined for the 
jury, have no application to the facts of this case. 
Additionally, the terms "annoy", "harass", "alarm", and "offend" 
are not susceptible to one comprehensive definition that fits all 
factual settings but have different thresholds for different 
persons in different settings. For instance, loud and raucous 
music may be acceptable at a rock concert or in the privacy of 
some people's homes; but the same music may be offensive in other 
people's homes or in funeral or religious settings. "Annoy", 
"harass", "alarm", and "offend" will likely have different 
meanings to each member of a jury, notwithstanding the Court's 
attempts at achieving defining instructions. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Thompson requests that this Court reverse the conviction 
given the ruling of Provo v. Whatcott, finding Utah Code 
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Annotated §76-9-201 to be unconstitutional. Thompson has 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the telephone 
harassment statute as applied to the facts of his case. He also 
has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on 
its face. The subject statute has a real and substantial 
deterrent effect on protected speech and the statute is not 
readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state's 
courts; therefore, it is unconstitutionally overbroad. 
Additionally, the statute is unconstitutionally vague and cannot 
be cured by a narrowing judicial construction by the state's 
courts. Because the statute is overbroad and vague it must be 
stricken down because it violates the guarantees of the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as Article I, 
Section 15 of the Constitution of Utah, and it cannot be applied 
to defendant or anyone else. 
DATED this ' ^ ^ day of February, 2001. 
DANA M. FA 
Counsel for Appellant 
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